Jan Šinágl angažovaný občan, nezávislý publicista

Information about what is happening at the Czech Embassy in Rabat last year brings back memories of recent scandals of a similar type, especially in the Asian region. The question arises - does the Czech Republic really protect its borders and citizens? And then the borders of Schengen, ie the EU? Or is it more inclined to trade in visas, and if so, where does this money go?

There is talk in insider circles that visa buying affairs sometimes occur everywhere, almost everywhere. Certainly not among the Scandinavians, they are known for their correctness and rigor, sometimes even meticulously following regulations and laws. But sometimes it happens with the French, Spaniards, Italians, and very often with diplomats from the former socialist states. These tend to be somewhat corrupt in order to make money. Salaries in ex-communist states are lower than in the West, and finances tend to motivate many to pursue diplomacy.They earn significantly more at embassies than in the Czech Republic, at the same time a career can be built. Even the title of an ordinary attaché sounds somehow dignified, and it immediately comes to mind. In addition, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs is known abroad for easily issuing diplomatic passports to administrative staff such as consular assistants, secretaries and landlords. The classical powers are based on distinguishing diplomats from other personnel, and they certainly do not lend diplomatic passports to these persons. However, the fact of granting a passport can already have some motivation, for example, to facilitate the movement of a person across borders and ensure the transfer of something that should not be carried properly. This can be finances, but also other matters.

Just look at the Ministry's answer to your questions and the CVs it provided. It would be interesting to see Ms Payard and Ms Kocurková whether they hold diplomatic or service passports and why. Given that there is definitely something wrong with this embassy, ​​even this seemingly detail can play a role.

Central Europe is a European cultural center, but from the previous regime it is affected by lower wage levels and the modern search for mammon. So people like to improve their situation and the visa agenda can be an easy source of side income. Ten years ago, the traffickers offered one thousand to two thousand dollars for one visa, today we are in euros and the amounts have risen significantly. Just issue a few visas aside and it is easy to save on a car or apartment and house.

The critical states, of course, know this very well, and they are trying to deploy their clever guys to the consuls of these states to turn them around their fingers and get them to cooperate. The African and Arab regions are critical, but also Russia, Ukraine and Vietnam. It was Vietnam that entered the history of visa fraud with a gem - two Russians broke into the Czech Republic's electronic visa system, and for five years since 2013, they have been able to control it so that only Vietnamese who have paid in advance, and not a little, could access it. The seznam.cz server stated that the police arrested several people, and the accused group was to earn over 763 million crowns by purchasing visas. The tax paid by the Vietnamese to hackers was to amount to 380,000 CZK, i.e. 15,000 euros. The so-called Visapoint system was introduced in 2009, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wanted to end endless queues in front of the Czech Embassy in Hanoi and trade with the order of applicants. Applicants had to register on the website, which meant sitting at a computer for a long time and waiting for the moment to free up This was practically impossible, as the Russian brothers broke into the system, overcame the CAPTCHA verification code and registered only those Vietnamese who paid in bold. .

Vietnamese living in the Czech Republic played a mediating role. The chairman of the Czech-Vietnamese company Marcel Winter kept drawing the attention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic to corruption and registration trading. The electronic system was finally shut down in 2017, and a special telephone line for registration was set up at the embassy in Hanoi. Using the modem and hundreds of telephone SIM cards, microcomputers, and other equipment, the Voronin brothers created a telephone exchange, which constantly dialed the registration number, disabling it. They then released the line only when they wanted to register their Vietnamese. The Russians thus got over 2,000 Vietnamese to the Czech Republic. According to seznam.cz, the finances were hidden in various companies.

Another problematic point of the Czech visa system was also Mongolia (where, according to one Schengen visa applicant, up to 130 EURO was paid for arranging a meeting for an interview at the embassy via the web system) and Ukraine. In November 2016, Lidovky.cz drew attention to the difficulties of visapoint.eu and the impossibility of registering applicants for long-term residence in the Czech Republic. At that time, the editors cited fees of 800 euros to the mediation mafia and also the share of one of the employees of the Czech embassy abroad in fraud. Without the participation of people * from the inside *, everything is quite difficult to implement. * The visa mafia works 24 hours a day, * said František Teplý, director of Alphacon (providing employees from Mongolia) and Bohdan Rajci for LN at the timefrom the non-profit Ukrainian initiative added: * When you pay, you get on the waiting list *.

Ukraine has long been a painful point for Czech visa diplomacy. iDNES published a report in 2009 with reference to the Korrespondent server, aktualně.cz and the Ukrainian newspaper Segodnia. Ukrainians had to order at GK Lovov by phone through the call center and pay telephone fees to a private Czech company. Registration was charged at $ 20 and had to be paid by more than 30,000 visa applicants in 8 months. The owner of the Czech company Jihomoravská, which operated a call center and collected funds, was to be a close friend of Ambassador Jaroslav Bašta. According to the server, this company was to be selected without a tender. ČTK further stated that Consul General Hradil ended his position in February 2009 less than a month after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abolished the system of strange registration. In January 2010, iDNES.cz published a report on Ambassador Bašta's intention to resign for health reasons. Although the Consulate General did not fall directly under it and * had nothing to do with the operation of the call center *, Mr. Bašta told MF DNES that * the situation is serious, complicates Czech-Ukrainian relations and of course complicates his position… *

In July 2019, Mr. Svatopluk Čumba resigned as Czech Ambassador to Iran after three years in office. According to the DenikN and iDNES.cz portals, he was to leave the position in connection with suspicion of visa shopping for Iranian entrepreneurs after an investigation by the General Inspectorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the embassy. He was primarily to issue visas to people recommended by the Czech-Slovak-Iranian Chamber of Commerce led by Jan Kavan (former Foreign Minister) and Zdeněk Zbytek. It was supposed to be about 400 people. * It is true that I helped arrange visas for Iranian businessmen, * confirmed to the portal the Iranian Amir Tavakoli, who was supposed to pick people up. According to DenikN, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated disciplinary proceedings against the former ambassador. The whole case was started by advertisements on social networks in Iran that a visa can be obtained for anyone, even previously unsuccessful people, through the above-mentioned chamber. Mr. Chumba happily works at the Ministry in the Department of Arab States and it seems that the disciplinary proceedings have somehow been forgotten.

In the past, the Consulate General in Erbil was even completely closed for some time and its staff returned to headquarters, because the consulate issued a huge number of visas without proper control, practically like a factory.

As Metro.cz states on November 27, 2019 in the article * Mafia from the East sold visas *. * The less democratic the regime in the country where the capital comes from, the higher the risk that companies there may be forced to suppress their own economic interests against the political, military and intelligence goals of the state. It is common to try to access information from within the office, such as planned decisions and planned analyzes. Some authorities were unable to function properly due to staff instability and disputes between their officials, which sometimes call into question the legitimacy of the entire authority's decision-making *, quoting from the Counterintelligence Annual Report - focusing on risks arising from economic activities of entities linked to foreign countries.

As the former Ambassador of the Czech Republic to the USA, Michael Žantovský, correctly stated for DeníkN, visas are a matter of security for the Czech Republic and the entire Schengen system. Especially at a time when we are facing the risks of terrorism, applicants need to be well screened, cooperated with local police and security forces in the fight against human trafficking, narcotics, the fight against international crime and the fight against terrorism.

The published information on the activities of Ambassador Viktor Lorenc in Rabat falls within the above framework. According to Hlídacípes.org, his strange applicants for Schengen visas were in fact going to France, not to the Czech Republic, and the question is whether it would only be illegal economic migration. If we remember the terrorist attacks in France and Spain, we unfortunately find the Moroccan element there. The Moroccan security forces are vigilant about the security situation in the country and are working closely with the EU. They sent warning signals about those who took part in these attacks. Unfortunately, in vain. In August 2017, the Spanish media reported: The alleged involvement of several Moroccan nationals raises concerns among Western security officials about how deeply radical Islamic groups have infiltrated communities with four million people across the European Union. The Spanish authorities said that most of the 12-strong network, which they believe portrayed and carried out Thursday's rampage in and near Barcelona, ​​were Moroccan nationals or of Moroccan origin.

Spanish and Portuguese defense officials have significantly strengthened cooperation with Morocco in the fight against terrorism. As the Kingdom of North Africa suffered from public relations following the terrorist attacks of late 2018, there was a significant increase in security cooperation with Spain and Portugal, along with other European nations. Soldiers from the United States, Canada, Tunisia, Senegal, and Spain regularly participate in African lion military exercises in Morocco, with Moroccan counterparts in ground and air exercises to strengthen cooperation, support, and tactical understanding between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. The fact that the African lion took place in Morocco is significant because the kingdom is trying to raise the profile of its security capabilities after two Scandinavian  tourists in the Atlas area were brutally murdered in December 2018.

Morocco is interested in cooperating well with the EU and individual Member States in the fight against human trafficking, terrorism and cyber security. EU embassies should help and not become the center of exactly opposite activities.

On the one hand, in EU-Morocco cooperation, we inspire the kingdom to cooperate in the fight against illegal migration, trafficking in drugs, arms and human beings, and on the other hand, we turn a blind eye to fraudsters at our embassies? This does not correspond and raises doubts about how sincere our interest in security really is.

Radim Radník, 4.8.2020

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Of course I will inform all responsible institutions of the country, including Government of the Czech Republic, President of the Czech Republic, the Commission for security of Czech Parliament, all MPs, senators, Security Information Service under the Government, European Commission, MP of European Parliament, NATO and OLAF European Anti-Fraud Office.

I also informed the world's renowned media: BBC, NZZ, The Times, FAZ, New York Times, Le Figaro, Washington Post and others.

All the above mentioned practices can be danger to the security of the European Union, not only of the Czech Republic. It is not just matter of economic illegal/legal migration but especially the danger of possible terrorist threats.

Jan Šinágl, 6.8.2020

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La République tchèque :échange-t-elle des visas ou protège-t-elle nos frontières Schengen et notre sécurité?

Handelt die Tschechische Republik mit Visen oder schützt sie unsere Schengen-Grenzen und unsere Sicherheit?

Letter of former Ambassador of Slovenia to he Czech Republic in the matter of unacceptable situation at Czech Embassy in Morocco - visa business

Moroccans and the second generation among Jihadists in Spain

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The 9th anniversary of the founding of our organization Sodales Solonis and the 1st anniversary of the brutal direct attack on the freedom of speech.

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